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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Michael Comstock 
 
Slavneft scandal 
In cash-strapped Russia, every penny counts. With the coming privatization of 
the last of the state gas corporations, Slavneft, a great many pennies have 
attracted the glaring eye of an interior ministry investigation. In effect, the 
Russian government alleges that Yury Sukhanov, the president of Slavneft, had 
hidden the amount of (virtual) income, causing the government to lose $600 
million in the past year. The investigation was highly politicized since Sukhanov 
is an appointee of Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov, and had been opposed by 
an individual viewed as aligned with President Putin. (ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, 10 
Jul 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) Surprisingly, the charges against 
Sukhanov were dropped in mid-July for lack of evidence. (THE ST. 
PETERSBURG TIMES, 16 Jul 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) This 
development hardly can be regarded as a victory for the usually unstoppable 
forces of President Vladimir Putin.  
 
At the same time, the Kremlin has submitted a new amendment to the Natural 
Resources Law that would change the terminology of government-granted "oil 
licensing" to "oil concessions." This apparently minor change in fact would have a 
major impact on the flow of cash that is generated by the exploitation of natural 
resources: Any mineral extracted could become state property, and the 
extracting institution (an oil company, for instance) could be recompensed by the 
government, rather than through sale on the market. This amendment provides 
another battleground for the apparent contest between the Putin faction and the 
older Yel'tsin faction, as represented by Prime Minister Kasyanov. The Yel'tsin 
faction generally has been linked to the oil oligarchs, and these interests stand to 
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lose by the change. Proposed by Dmitry Kozak, a deputy director in the Kremlin 
administration, the amendment would allow the federal government to benefit 
from (putatively) increased revenues. It appears that a compromise may be 
reached and that, in return for the withdrawal of this amendment, the gas giants, 
such as Slavneft, will be forced to divert more money to the government in the 
form of taxes. (ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, Jul 02; via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) In sum, it seems that President Putin will have managed to achieve 
victory after all, albeit in a more roundabout fashion than usual.  
 
Significantly, exiled tycoon Boris Berezovsky has called the proposed 
amendment the third and final step in President Putin's quest to transform Russia 
into an autocracy: "The bill prepared by Kozak is the result of a direct order from 
President Putin; it essentially represents an attempt to carry out the final stage in 
creating a fully-fledged authoritarian state -- which is centralized in all its 
essential aspects, and is thus unconstitutional." (VEDOMOSTI, 7 Aug 02; via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) 
 
Cabinet reform and economic considerations 
Currently there is a debate within the Council of Ministers about the timing and 
degree of economic reform proposed by the president. A radical approach 
requested by the "liberals" is opposed by a more evolutionary approach 
advocated by the more "conservative" apparatchiki. The Minister of Economic 
Development and Trade, German Gref, and the First Deputy Prime Minister, 
Alexei Kudrin, lead the "liberal" group, while Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov 
and the Chief of Cabinet Staff, Igor Shuvalov, head the apparatchiki. Putin 
himself will decide the outcome, and it is in his interest to allow the debate to 
continue, which means a de facto victory for the gradual approach. Were he to 
settle for the radical way there would be no turning back, and a new cabinet 
would have a year or so to settle in; however, if he leaves the debate undecided, 
he can keep the current cabinet as a scapegoat for a rainy day. Should the 
Russian economy deteriorate rapidly, as some fear it may, Putin could deflect 
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criticism to the current cabinet. (VREMYA NOVOSTEI, 8 Aug 02; via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) 
 
President Putin also has attempted to allay the battle between the "liberals," 
championed by Gref's Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, who desire 
membership in the WTO, and the "oligarchs" who oppose it. In early July, Putin 
called on his Security Council to serve as an "admissions coordinator" for 
Russia's entrance to the WTO. Large-scale producers have hailed this 
development, since the Security Council under Vladimir Rushailo is expected to 
be heavily influenced by the "oligarchs." (VEDOMOSTI, 10 Jul 02; via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) Putin also has appointed Colonel General 
Vladislav Putilin to the post of Deputy Minister of Economic Development and 
Trade. Putilin had to cope with conscription, as the General Staff's Chief of the 
Main Organization and Mobilization Directorate, until his recent appointment. 
(EKHO MOSKVY, 11 Jul 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) It would be a 
fair guess that he would favor the industrial giants with which the Russian military 
is involved, and hence the "oligarchs." 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Michael Donahue 
 
Don't go away mad...just go away 
While history will record the achievements of public figures, whether they are 
statesmen, scientists or athletes, it is left to each generation to decide why and 
how contemporary personalities, great and small, are to be remembered. There 
are times when even the most revered figure must step away from the spotlight 
voluntarily lest he forever scar his legacy by appearing too hungry for applause 




Convicted (in absentia) in May of "abuse of office and stealing explosives," the 
former special services lieutenant colonel has been living in Britain for the past 
two years. Litvinenko fled Russia after allegedly refusing an FSB order to 
assassinate Boris Berezovsky. Subsequently he co-authored "The FSB Blows up 
Russia," which accuses the agency of masterminding the 1999 bombings in 
Moscow and Volgodonsk that killed more than 300 persons, an atrocity for which 
the FSB always has blamed Chechen terrorists. The bombings constituted the 
catalyst for the second Chechan War, with which Putin's rise to power is 
associated. The FSB recently (with cooperation from Georgian security forces) 
apprehended and interrogated a leading figure in its investigation of the affair, 
Adam Dekkushev. (THE MOSCOW TIMES, 26 Jul 02; via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database, and INTERFAX, 1101 GMT, 16 Jul 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0716, via 
World News Connection) 
 
Under interrogation, Dekkushev, in turn, supposedly fingered the (recently 
assassinated) Chechen warlord Khattab and Achemez Gochiyaev as being 
responsible for the attacks. Litvinenko claims to have been able somehow to 
contact Gochiyaev, the FSB's "most wanted man," and convince him to provide a 
video and written statement that Litvinenko read on his behalf. (THE MOSCOW 
TIMES, 26 Jul 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
Following the recent arrest of Alimzhan Tokhtakhunov (also known as "the 
Taiwanese") for allegedly fixing the Olympic skating results in Salt Lake City, 
Utah, Litvinenko stated that he was "ready to testify" against Tokhtakhunov and 
prepared to prove that Russia's leadership knew that Tokhtakhunov had links to 
Russian criminal gangs. (EKHO MOSKVY NEWS AGENCY, 0230 GMT, 4 Aug 
02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database)  
 
Without judging the authenticity of Litvinenko's claims concerning the Gochiyaev 
and Tokhtakhunov affairs, the problem is that by proliferating his public 
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appearances on various issues linked to the FSB, Litvinenko detracts from the 
credibility of the very serious charges contained in "The FSB Blows up Russia." 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Luba Schwartzman 
 
A nuclear Iran 
The biggest stumbling block in the US-Russian relationship is Russia's insistence 
on supplying Iran with nuclear reactors. Russia announced at the end of July that 
not only will it complete the first reactor at Bushehr, it will bid to supply the 
remaining three reactors at the site (INTERFAX, 29 Jul 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-
0729, via World News Connection). Bushehr-1 is slated to receive its nuclear 
material from Russia at the end of 2003 (INTERFAX, 5 Aug 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-
0805, via World News Connection). Earlier in July, the Russian government 
approved a resolution to sign a long-term program for trade, economic, industrial, 
scientific and technical cooperation with Iran that would stipulate Russia's 
possible involvement in building two 1,000-megawatt units in Ahwaz as well. The 
agreement remains a draft at this time, but the economic benefits for the 
Russians of remaining in the business are immense. Russia is to receive in 
excess of $800 million for Bushehr-1 and at least $1 billion for each reactor 
thereafter. The agreement is scheduled to be finalized this fall. (INTERFAX, 26 
Jul 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0726, via World News Connection)  
 
Most significant is that Russia appears to be deliberately following a course of 
action that brings it into conflict with the United States, despite recent pledges 
made at the G-7(8) Summit -- not to mention that Iran's intentions concerning 
these projects remain ambiguous. These Russian announcements, made just 
prior to the arrival of a high-level US delegation led by Secretary of Energy 
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Spencer Abraham, seem to have been timed to cause maximum damage. After 
his meeting with Russian officials "at the highest levels," Secretary Abraham 
stressed that the issue remained "of utmost concern" to the US, while 
Ambassador Vershbow expressed concern over "potential assistance" on 
chemical and biological weapons that Iran may be gaining from contacts with 
Russia.  
 
The Putin doctrine places absolute priority on filling the coffers of the state. Iran 
has said essentially that it will buy whatever Moscow will sell. The United States 
has pledged funds to assist Russia in various undertakings, but nowhere near 
the estimated value of contracts with Iran. 
 
Threat from the East, but from where? 
Presidential Envoy to the Far Eastern Federal District, Konstantin Pulikovsky, 
stated in an interview with Izvestiya on 23 July that "in the Far East, like nowhere 
else, there are practically all possible threats to national security. We live in a 
unique region," he continued, "a sparsely populated krai with open expanses that 
is surrounded by the strongest powers in the world." Pulikovsky's thoughts seem 
somewhat offbeat given the currently cozy relationship Russia shares with China 
and North Korea and its warming relationship with Japan (see below). Perhaps 
his comments represent the growing recognition of the threat that China poses, 
at the very least demographically, to Russia's Asian hinterland. Given Russia's 
ongoing arms sell-off to China, however, it is doubtful whether this message has 
reached Moscow. 
 
Improving relations with Japan 
Pulikovsky is not the only Russian keeping an eye on the east, however. Gen. 
Konstantin Totsky, director of Russia's Federal Border Service, met in Tokyo with 
Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi on 15 July to discuss border issues 
to be included in an action plan the two countries are trying to develop. The plan 
focuses on greater cooperation in dealing with "unidentified" ships of suspected 
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North Korean origin that are involved in smuggling and illegal fishing in the Sea 
of Japan. The action plan is to be concluded in time for Prime Minister Junichiro 
Koizumi's state visit to Russia expected in December or January. (KYODO 
NEWS SERVICE, 15 Jul 02; via lexis-nexis) (Totsky arrived in Japan on 14 July 
and met with Larissa Gamov, widow of Vitali Gamov, the former chief of the 
Russian Coast Guard for the Pacific region who died from the severe burns he 
received from a May arson attack in Sakhalin. Totsky told ITAR-TASS during his 
trip that he blames the fishing industry "mafia" in the Russian Far East for 
Gamov's assassination.) The plan of action already may have borne fruit during 
Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov's two-day visit to North Korea 29-30 July. Ivanov told 
journalists during the trip that the DPRK "is ready for a constructive dialogue with 
the United States and Japan without any preliminary conditions." (ITAR-TASS, 
24 Jul 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0724, via World News Connection) Cooperation 
between Russia and Japan may lead to the resolution of some of the longer-
standing issues between the two countries including the status of the disputed 
Kuril Islands. 
 
Arms for oil 
Meanwhile the largest Russian military exercises in the Caspian region since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union got underway on 1 August. The exercises involve 
more than 60 combat ships and 10,000 marines, as well as border guard and 
railroad units and detachments of the emergency situations ministry, the interior 
ministry, and the Federal Security Service (FSB). President Putin authorized the 
drills in April following a summit at which the leaders of Russia, Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan, Iran and Azerbaijan failed to resolve problems related to dividing 
up the Caspian Sea resources. The demonstration of military might is, in effect, 
an indication of the importance Moscow places on settling the dispute in a 
manner favorable to Russia. (ITAR-TASS, 8 Aug 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0808, via 




Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
UKRAINE 
Words and actions: two roads diverged  
During the last several months, much attention has been paid to Ukraine's 
announcement that it is ready to begin negotiations for admission to NATO. The 
move, some journalists and political pundits asserted, was a break with the 
country's neutral foreign policy orientation in favor of a Westward-leaning 
approach. "After a decade of independence and straddling the line between two 
worlds," The Washington Post said, "Ukraine has decided that it wants more from 
the West than television signals." The country, the paper explained, "has set its 
sights on finally integrating with the rest of Europe." (WASHINGTON POST, 5 
Aug 02) Perhaps. Or perhaps that's just a wee bit of an exaggeration.  
 
On 23 May, National Security and Defense Council Chairman Yevhen Marchuk 
announced, "The Council agreed that a long-term strategy must be worked out 
that would enable Ukraine to join the collective security system on which NATO 
is based." (INTERFAX, 23 May 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0523, via World News 
Connection) This was not a ringing endorsement of NATO, to say the least.  
 
Later, in a letter to NATO Secretary-General George Robertson, President 
Leonid Kuchma suggested that the decision "is a logical continuation of Ukraine's 
policy of Euro-Atlantic integration given the current level of special partnership 
with NATO." (INTERFAX, 29 May 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0529, via World News 
Connection) And in fact, this is the case. The announcement actually signifies no 
change in policy with regard to the alliance. It is simply an articulation of the 
current situation, which has seen Ukraine in a close and steadily building 
relationship with NATO for a number of years. It was never a secret that the 
country eventually would seek membership. But, while Ukraine's desire to 
integrate more fully into NATO should be welcomed, the actions of its leaders 
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demonstrate that they are not prepared to move toward Europe in any other way. 
"Integrating with the rest of Europe," as the Post stated, is a long way off. In fact, 
in many respects, the country today seems less Western-oriented than at any 
time in its short history.  
 
Over the last year, following accusations that he was complicit in both the murder 
of journalist Georgiy Gongadze and alleged arms sales to Iraq, Kuchma has 
created his own special brand of post-Soviet authoritarianism. In fact, at the 
same time that the country was moving forward with its NATO plans, Kuchma 
and his supporters appeared to be stepping up their attempts forcibly to silence 
their critics and limit dissent. 
 
Take, for example, the new tax investigations of 20 businesses connected to 
parliamentary deputies from Viktor Yushchenko's opposition Our Ukraine 
coalition. According to the Ukrayinska pravda newspaper, which is affiliated with 
the opposition, the investigations were all opened at the same time, and 
coincided with Our Ukraine's announcement that it may take part in public 
demonstrations calling for Kuchma's impeachment. (UKRAYINSKA PRAVDA, 
2047 CET, 8 Aug 02) The demonstrations are to begin on 16 September, the 
anniversary of Gongadze's disappearance. 
 
Meanwhile, Kuchma-appointed Prosecutor-General Svyatoslav Pyskun has filed 
new extortion and larceny charges against opposition leader Yulia Tymoshenko. 
Just months ago Tymoshenko had similar charges dismissed by a Kyiv court; 
she suggests she is being targeted again because she is the organizer of the 
upcoming demonstrations. "These are old accusations," she said, "and the Kyiv 
Sviatoshyn district court ruled them null and void." This new case, she told 
reporters, is simply designed "to intimidate, ...and to persuade that this [protest 
action] is not worth undertaking." (UKRAYINSKA PRAVDA, 2013 CET, 2 Aug 02) 
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The prosecutor-general has also begun investigating Kyiv Mayor Oleksandr 
Omelchenko. The mayor, not coincidentally, is an independent-minded Our 
Ukraine supporter who may figure heavily in the planned protest action. It seems 
this protest has left Mr. Pyskun a very busy man.  
 
In case these investigations don't work, however, the prosecutor-general's office 
has suggested that perhaps Gongadze was not murdered and is, in fact, alive. 
"Today, we do not know who's body that is," Deputy Prosecutor-General Viktor 
Shokin suddenly announced recently. No doubt the US and German forensic 
examiners who conducted tests on the remains and conclusively identified the 
body as Gongadze will be surprised to hear this. (INTERFAX, 1728 CET, 10 Aug 
02; via www.pravda.com.ua) But, since Ukraine continues to stand in the way of 
an American- and British-backed international commission to look into the 
murder, it seems unlikely that any new testing or investigating will be done soon. 
 
This, of course, is fine with Kuchma. It does leave him in an awkward position, 
however, as he strives for attention from NATO. Unfortunately for Ukraine, 
Kuchma's actions mean that international political leaders will hesitate to 
embrace fully any of his proposals. Hence, the response to Ukraine's NATO 
overtures has been encouraging but subdued. "To those skeptical of Ukraine's 
commitment to the Euro-Atlantic community, now is the time to dispel the 
skepticism through Ukraine's own actions," US Ambassador to Ukraine Carlos 
Pascual said. (THE WASHINGTON TIMES, 18 Jul 02)  
 
So far, that hasn't happened. In fact, not long after Pascual's statement, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) announced that it would not release the next 
tranche of an Extended Fund Facility loan to Ukraine. As privatization has 
stopped, oligarchs have taken over and the legislature has largely been made 
ineffectual, the economy has spiraled downward.  
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That is not to say that Kuchma has no friends. In recent months, the president 
has spent more and more time with Russian President Vladimir Putin. In fact, 
Kuchma recently spent his birthday with Putin in Moscow. While there, Kuchma 
signed a number of agreements dealing with, among other things, trade and 
nuclear power, and made plans to sign several more. The most important and 
controversial will be an agreement to set up an "international" consortium -- so 
far consisting only of Ukraine and Russia, with the possible addition of Germany -
- to manage and upgrade Ukraine's gas pipeline system. The agreement could 
give Russia control of Ukraine's most important asset. Of course, should anyone 
object, they are likely to be met by police at their door. Prosecutor-General 
Pyskun appears to be quite adept at quickly opening investigations. 
 
Given these factors, then, it is difficult to reconcile Ukraine's NATO aspirations 
and statements about European integration with its actions. Perhaps the country 
one day will be prepared to join the Western club, but President Kuchma and his 
supporters are ensuring that this is not that day. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
GEORGIA 
What is holding back the Russians? 
For the last two weeks Russian officials have been threatening to invade 
Georgia, ostensibly to combat Chechen fighters who have taken refuge in 
Georgia's Pankisi Gorge. Russia is testing the response from the international 
community and within Georgia. "The only way to resolve this problem is by 
force," said Sergei Ivanov, the Russian defense minister. (WWW.STRANA.RU, 
10 Aug 02) 
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Over the same two weeks the war rhetoric has been bolstered by aggression -- 
two instances have been registered of Russian aircraft bombing Georgian 
territory and two instances of soldiers landing in the Kodori Gorge. Most analysts 
are predicting an imminent Russian strike against the Pankisi Gorge (the region 
of Georgia that borders Chechnya and hosts several thousand Chechen 
refugees and, according to some sources, Chechen fighters) and possibly in the 
Kodori Gorge (the region of Georgia abutting the secessionist Abkhaz region). 
 
The accusation that Georgia harbors terrorists hinges on the apparent incursion 
from Pankisi into the Itum Kale district of Chechnya, during which Chechen 
fighters engaged Russian forces in late July. Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said 
that the incursion amounted to an act of aggression against Russia. Sergei 
Mironov, the chairman of the Federation Council, said that Putin would obtain 
enthusiastic parliamentary approval for a military strike. (MOSCOW TIMES, 8 
Aug 02) However, there is doubt that the incident took place at all since local 
administrators told Russian reporters that everything in the region was quiet. 
(CHECHNYA WEEKLY, 8 Aug 02) Similarly, no border violation was registered 
by the OSCE monitoring mission on the Georgian-Chechen border. 
 
Vladimir Ustinov, the Russian prosecutor-general, flew to Tbilisi on 6 August to 
secure the extradition of 13 Chechen fighters who were arrested after crossing 
from Russia into Georgia. The Georgians rebuffed this request, saying that 
Ustinov did not present proper documentation to warrant the extradition. This 
prompted Putin again to accuse the Georgians of harboring terrorists. "We will 
judge the seriousness of the Georgian authorities' intentions to fight terrorism by 
how soon these criminals are sent to Lefortovo prison (in Moscow) " he said. 
(THE GUARDIAN, 7 Aug 02; via lexis-nexis)  
 
Despite the bluster, Russia's legal case is very weak. As Pavel Felgenhauer, an 
independent defense analyst based in Moscow, points out, there is little ground 
for the charge of terrorism or harboring terrorists. "Under international law 
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combatants of a separatist internal armed conflict can be interned if they cross 
over into a neutral country, but they cannot be sent back for punishment, " he 
writes. "Fighting the armed uniformed Russian troops does not make Chechen 
rebels terrorists or criminals under the Geneva Convention." (MOSCOW TIMES, 
8 Aug 02) 
 
Russian forces bolstering the rebel Abkhaz government have been activated as 
well. On 31 July, Russian soldiers staged incursions into the Kodori Gorge and 
on 12 August Abkhaz fighters entered the gorge. A similar incursion was repelled 
by Georgia in April. (WWW.CIVIL.GE)  
 
The Georgian side has shown a united front and has not budged an inch despite 
mounting Russian aggression. President Eduard Shevardnadze steadfastly 
refuses to allow Russia to carry out ethnic cleansing in Pankisi. Instead the 
Georgians arrested three Russian MVD officers in the Pankisi Gorge. 
(WWW.CIVIL.GE, 10 Aug 02, and KOMMERSANT, 3 Aug 02) The three are 
charged with illegal border crossing and, if their identification does not check out, 
impersonating a police officer. Under these charges they run the risk of a one- to 
three-year jail sentences. 
 
Valery Chkheidze, commander of Georgia's border guards, authored an 
articulate rebuttal in the 11 August issue of Moskovskiye novosti. He argued that 
the problem of the Pankisi Gorge is an internal issue of a criminal (hence not 
international) nature. He went on to say that Russia has failed to stabilize the 
conditions in any of the famous gorges in Chechnya and there is no reason to 
suppose it would prove more successful in Pankisi. Chkheidze accused Russian 
border guards stationed on the boundary and in South Ossetia and Abkhazia of 
allowing the Chechen fighters (estimated at 150) to cross into Georgia. He ended 
the article by pointing out that Russian bluster about operations in Georgia 
reminds him of former Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev's promise to 
take Grozny in two weeks with only two battalions. 
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Other measures undertaken by Georgia include forming a new tactical alert task 
force under National Security Council Secretary Tedo Japaridze to provide 
information and analyses directly to the president. (CAUCASUS PRESS, 11 Aug 
02; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, via lexis-nexis) Earlier, Georgia stopped 
Russian air traffic over its territory during daytime. Russian planes may overfly 
Georgian territory only between 2 a.m. and 8 a.m.. (FINANCIAL TIMES, 9 Aug 
02; via lexis-nexis) 
 
Most analysts are predicting imminent war. Yet it seems equally pertinent to ask 
why the war has not started already. What are the factors holding back the 
Russian war machine? The response of the international community has been 
muted at best. Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov has had two conversations 
with his US counterpart, Colin Powell, which broached the situation in Georgia. 
(WWW.CIVIL.GE, 10 Aug 02) The details of the conversations are not being 
disclosed. Despite mounting Russian aggression, there has been no public 
censure from the UN, the OSCE or other international institutions or European 
states. If the West is containing Russia at all, it is doing so very quietly. 
 
The more serious checks on Russian behavior derive from the manifest unity of 
the Georgian public and the decrepit state of the Russian military. In the last two 
years there were two occasions when Russian pressure prompted internal unrest 
in Georgia. In January 2000, when Russia stopped the supply of electricity and 
gas, protestors in Tbilisi started calling for the government to step down. On that 
occasion the government survived, but in November 2001 mass rallies in Tbilisi 
did force a government resignation. At the peak of the crisis Shevardnadze's 
resignation was also mooted. This time, however, none of Shevardnadze's many 
rivals has stirred. The opposition's nationalist credentials would be destroyed if 
they came to power as the result of Russian aggression. This national cohesion 
is the most remarkable and surprising element of the current crisis. The absence 
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of an internal pro-Russian opposition that could be installed as a puppet 
government is the biggest deterrent to Russian aggression. 
 
With the Russian military already mired in Chechnya, Russian planners might be 
wary of trying their hand at another war against a nationalist-minded society. 
Officially, there are 80,000 Russian soldiers in Chechnya, but the real number is 
probably over 100,000. This means that Russia's most battle-ready forces are 
already committed. Moreover, these units have been unable to contend with an 
estimated 7,000 Chechen fighters over a period of three years. There is no 
reason to suppose that the miserable Russian military would perform better in 
Georgia than it has in Chechnya. In the absence of popular unrest or a coup 
d'état, Putin might not risk a military campaign. 
 
CHECHNYA 
Maskhadov and Basaev reconcile  
Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov recently appeared in a joint press 
conference with long-term rival Shamil Basaev. The tape showing the two men 
together was shot apparently in Chechnya in July and was broadcast on NTV on 
23 July. (ASSOCIATED PRESS, 23 Jul 02; via lexis-nexis) Maskhadov 
announced that a new Defense Council uniting all the Chechen forces has been 
formed. The president appointed Shamil Basaev to the position of deputy chief of 
this new structure -- in effect the deputy chief of staff of the Chechen armed 
forces. Concurrently, Akhmad Zakaev, formerly the president's representative, 
was made information minister overseeing all official publications. 
(WWW.CHECHENPRESS.COM, 22 Jul 02) 
 
Some analysts, such as Nezavisimaya gazeta's Ilyas Masksakov, saw in this 
event a positive change. Chechen units, he reasoned, have consolidated and no 
one now can deny that Maskhadov is in command of all the Chechen forces. 
(NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 23 Jul 02) However, the new unity has more 
pertinent implications, namely that Maskhadov no longer can dissociate himself 
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from the radical elements among the Chechen forces. Whereas in August 1999 
Maskhadov condemned Shamil Basaev's raids into Dagestan which triggered the 
current war, now apparently he has reconsidered his opposition. 
 
In the 1996-1999 period Maskhadov repeatedly miscalculated, choosing 
strategies that betrayed his weaknesses and only encouraged the rogue 
elements among Chechen factions. Among the oddities of his rule were bringing 
Shamil Basaev and Movladi Udugov into the government after they made a 
miserable showing in the January 1997 elections. In 1998 Maskhadov forgave an 
assassination attempt against himself after the odious Zelimkhan Yanderbiev and 
Arbi Baraev issued public apologies. Then in January 1999 Maskhadov instituted 
Shariah Law to outflank the radicals who were trying to oust him from power. The 
ill-considered maneuver robbed the president, the courts, the parliament and all 
other constitutional institutions of their legitimacy. 
 
Maskhadov's tendency to placate criminal and radical figures does not stem from 
ideological inclinations, cynicism or corruption. Rather, Maskhadov seems to 
have a deep faith in coalitions. This is reminiscent of the unwavering belief in 
"coalition building" in the war against terrorism on the part of elements in the 
State Department and elsewhere. Unable or unwilling to lead decisively, 
Maskhadov was and is willing to make any concession to create an illusion of 
unity.  
 
Sultygov's baby steps 
In the Russian-dominated part of Chechnya, Abdul Khakim Sultygov, the newly 
appointed presidential representative for human rights, has announced two 
initiatives. First, his office intends to collect a database of missing persons, 
including their names and the circumstances of the disappearance. The 
database would be made available freely on the Internet. (WWW.STRANA.RU, 5 
Aug 02) According to the official figures of the Chechen procuracy, 284 persons 
have disappeared in 2002 while the Chechen administration counts 110. 
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Sultygov would be better served if he took as his starting place the lists gathered 
by Memorial, which posts the names of missing persons after each zachistka on 
its web page. A rough estimate of the total missing is 3,000 persons since the 
start of the war. 
 
Sultygov's second initiative concerns earlier announced plans to develop a 
mechanism to control cleansings in order to eradicate abuses against the 
population. (See THE NIS OBSERVED, 22 Jul 02) Sultygov consulted with the 
newly appointed commander of the Joint Group of Forces in Chechnya, Sergei 
Makarov, who according to Sultygov has agreed that the Chechen MVD should 
play the primary role in the conduct of cleansings. On 8 August Sultygov voiced 
hopes that an edict transferring responsibility for cleansings to the Chechen MVD 
would be forthcoming in the next two weeks. (WWW.POLIT.RU, 8 Aug 02)  
 
This concept is hardly new. President Putin and many other officials have 
supported such measures on several occasions but they have never been 
implemented. Makarov's predecessor, General Moltenskoi, who was dismissed 
unexpectedly two weeks ago, had issued in January the infamous order No. 80 
which stipulated rules to govern the conduct of cleansings. Order No. 80 was 
honored exclusively in the breach. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By David Montgomery 
 
Religious persecution and extremism 
As the crackdown on minority faiths and more extremist trends in Islam 
continues, groups complaining of religious persecution find cause to resist the 
established political order. While the focus of large-scale resistance has been 
Islamic extremism, which has a remarkably broad network, Christian and Jewish 
groups are being denied the opportunity of political expression. Together, the 
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repression of religious expression fosters discontent with the governments in 
power and does little to yield stability to the existing political structures. 
 
In Uzbekistan, some evangelical Christian churches have been closed for 
operating without permits. Independent Muslims have been imprisoned for 
alleged connections with Wahhabist groups. And the state has barred minority 
faiths (faiths with a minority of adherents in Central Asia) from preaching in 
Uzbek. (KESTON INSTITUTE NEWS SERVICE, 29 Jul 02, 22 Jul 02 and 27 May 
02; via www.keston.org) Furthermore, anti-Semitism is advocated by 
fundamentalist Islamic groups such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT). Though HT is 
watched closely by the Uzbek government, the reason for the monitoring is not 
its anti-Semitic agenda but the fact that HT poses a threat to the existing 
government. 
 
While minority faiths are a nuisance to the government regimes, the small 
number of adherents makes them less threatening than groups such as HT, the 
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the Islamic Democratic Party in 
Kyrgyzstan (IDP) or the Islamic Revival Party in Tajikistan (IRP). The 
governments of Central Asia tend to justify the crackdown on Islamic extremist 
organizations by using bureaucratic tactics to keep opposition illegal.  
 
In Kyrgyzstan, the newly established IDP predicted that it would be able to attract 
upwards of 100,000 members to challenge the current Akaev government. While 
the supporters predominately consist of the poor and oppressed, thus making 
them more likely to embrace radical means for change, it is assumed that IDP 
will have problems registering as a political party given the religious and 
confrontational bend of its ideology. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 29 Jul 02; via 
www.rferl.org) 
 
In Tajikistan, groups such as the IRP are quick to distance themselves from any 
Islamic activities that threaten their voice within government, by claiming that the 
 19 
Tajik citizens who fought with the Taliban were not members of IRP. It is worth 
noting that the IRP was at one time part of the United Tajik Opposition and 
banned by the government. Since 1998, however, it has been registered and 
entered the political mainstream with a membership numbering 2,000 and 
representation in the Tajik parliament. (INTERFAX, 1137 GMT, 1 Aug 02; FBIS-
SOV-2002-0801, via World News Connection) Said Abdullo Nuri, leader of the 
IRP, even has gone so far as to claim that any political participation by Muslim 
clerics is inappropriate and that clergy should abide by the state laws. (ITAR-
TASS, 0624 GMT, 2 Aug 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0802, via World News Connection)  
 
Nuri's comments appear related to the Tajik government's Council on Religious 
Affairs and the Council of Islamic Scholars which was sent to the north of the 
country to determine the familiarity of the clerics with state laws. President 
Rakhmonov, who visited Sughd Oblast' in July, complained of militant activities 
by Islamists and criticized the construction of mosques (specific concerns 
included HT). The resulting visit of the investigatory councils was the banning of 
10 clerics from the northern Isfara district. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 6 Aug 02, via 
www.rferl.org, and ITAR-TASS, 0624 GMT, 2 Aug 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0802; via 
World News Connection) While political regulations were used to control the 
clerics and content of their message, and while the labeling of a political 
opponent as a religious extremist (or Wahhabi) allows the oppression of political 
opposition, the banning of some clerics for political messages risks making them 
more popular with the population dissatisfied with the government. 
 
The cells of the resistance movements are quite extensive and, without 
addressing the root causes of opposition, the discontent is likely to proliferate 
beyond the national borders. For example, a captured member of the IMU 
admitted to participating in resistance campaigns in Afghanistan, Chechnya, 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Furthermore, he spoke of an extensive network of 
persons responsible for transiting militant religious extremists. (INTERFAX, 1408 
GMT, 2 Aug 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0802, via World News Connection) This 
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network includes general provisions of food and health services as well as more 
elaborate arrangements such as the bogus marriage of Uzbek Makhmudzhon 
Satimov to a Russian woman (thus granting him Russian citizenship and 
affording him the opportunity to preach and gain support for his extreme religious 
views outside of Uzbekistan). (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 25 Jul 02; FBIS-SOV-
2002-0725, via World News Connection) 
 
The denial of an effective outlet for expressing political opposition, in conjunction 
with the denial of religious expression, has led to more radical resistance 
movements that are organized and unsatisfied. While no solution immediately 
presents itself, it is clear that the roots of discontent must be addressed and the 
simple squelching of opposition is not the answer. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
By Michael Varuolo 
 
Two strikes...one to come?  
Like the dog that lives down the street and insists on barking whenever the wind 
blows, the Kaliningrad issue continues to annoy just about everyone familiar with 
the region. For months, Russia has been trying to use the enclave's existence to 
reassert its influence on Lithuanian affairs. Recently, these efforts have been 
intensified as Russian politicians and media seek to exploit opportunities 
provided by a couple of incidents. These revolve around the Russian desire to 
drill for oil in the Baltic Sea, as well as European Union (EU) involvement in 
negotiating an acceptable solution to transit concerns linked to Lithuanian's 
putative membership in the EU. 
 
The underlying cause of friction is Lithuania's desire to join the EU and the 
corresponding compliance with the Acquis, which effectively prohibits 
unrestricted travel between non-EU and EU countries. Russia asserts that the 
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Acquis would isolate Kaliningrad Oblast' (at least in terms of land travel); it is 
clear that EU membership would move Lithuania away irreversibly from Russia's 
sphere of influence. Having failed in its attempt to deter Lithuania from its EU 
objective, Russia has elevated the frequency of its international complaints 
concerning the "isolated" oblast' and is now forcing the issue through measured 
actions aimed at grabbing Europe's attention.  
 
Strike 1 ... 
Despite the fact that oil has never been found in massive quantities under the 
Baltic sea, Russia apparently now feels compelled to deploy the Baltic fleet to 
monitor and protect LUKoil assets in the region. According to a proclamation by 
Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, issued during his visit to the Lithuanian port city 
of Klaipeda, the Baltic Fleet is now responsible for ensuring the security of the 
Russian continental shelf in the vicinity of Kaliningrad. The LUKoil-
Kaliningradmorneft company is prepared to commence oil exploration there and 
needs the protection afforded by the Baltic Fleet, Ivanov said. Moreover, the fleet 
will serve as a necessary shield against terrorist strikes aimed against the 
Russian Federation. Ivanov further tried to justify the move to his Lithuanian 
audience by declaring that "any oil rig could be a target for terrorists." (NOVYE 
IZVESTIA, 1 Aug 02; via lexis-nexis) 
 
Perhaps the threat of a terrorist strike against a Russian oil rig is real. Even so, 
the positioning of a potentially hostile fleet floating only five kilometers away from 
the Lithuanian coast may add just enough "diplomatic" leverage to affect 
Russian-Lithuanian relations. Indeed, the size of the Russian Baltic Fleet, despite 
recent concerns about it combat preparedness, dwarfs the Lithuanian Navy and 
its total of seven ships. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE, 4 Jul 02; via lexis-nexis) 
Since the Baltic Fleet's headquarters is in the Kaliningrad Oblast', its new mission 
will not cause a drastic shift in its operations; however, it does represent a 
substantial investment of political capital by the Putin regime. Moscow has 
expended such capital in other areas already. "This is a normal process. Russia 
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has been doing it in the Caspian Sea and in the Pacific, and begins it in the Baltic 
and Arctic," Ivanov said. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE, 4 Jul 02; via lexis-nexis) 
Using a force of this size to prepare the region for the eventual division of the 
Baltic continental shelf would in fact provide for the assertion of Russian territorial 
claims, but would also serve to pressure Lithuania and the other Baltic states, a 
potent reminder of Russia's comparative relative power within the region.  
 
Strike 2... 
Russia's drive to maintain unrestricted travel through Lithuania for Russian 
military as well as civilian personnel and equipment has led to political friction 
over the cross-border transit of missile fuel. Recent legislation passed by 
Lithuania makes its transportation through that country illegal. The debate on the 
topic is getting considerable visibility in the Russian media, but is next to 
nonexistent in Baltic or other European outlets. This lack of Western media 
attention led Russia to assume a more aggressive attitude towards Lithuania and 
its transit policies involving Kaliningrad. Recently, Russia's assertion that the 
policy of restricted transit is fundamentally flawed has struck a chord in the EU.  
 
Russian reports claim that some members of the European Union are beginning 
to view the Russian position as justified. France has come to view the issue as 
particularly sensitive and is starting to show signs of breaking away from official 
EU policy. French President Jacques Chirac has indicated support for the 
Russian perspective, calling the requirement for Russians traveling through 
Lithuania to need a visa "not acceptable"; he added that there is a need for "other 
technical solutions" which seek not to "humiliate Russia." (EUROPEAN 
REPORT, 27 Jul 02; via lexis-nexis) Despite attempts by the French Foreign 
Minister, Dominique de Villepin, to downplay Chirac's comments and insist that 
France is not breaking ranks with the EU (AGENCE-FRANCE PRESSE, 29 Jul 
02; via lexis-nexis), the damage was done.  
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Apparently the possibility of cracks in the EU position has caused Lithuanian 
President Valdus Adamkus to seek a politically acceptable solution to the issue 
which involves the establishment of better lines of communication between 
Lithuania and Kaliningrad. (BNS, 31 Jul 02, 1558 GMT; FBIS-SOV-2002-0801, 
via World News Connection) Unfortunately Adamkus' rapprochement was 
deemed by Moscow to be too little too late and Russia was able to bring the 
issue directly to Brussels for consultations and negotiations. The talks 
commenced on 24 July but have provided little in the form of progress to date. 
(AGENCE-FRANCE PRESSE, 24 Jul 02; via lexis-nexis)  
 
Lithuania now finds itself in the familiar historic position of having two large 
European powers negotiate between themselves for a mutually beneficial 
solution. The solution, apparently to be determined by a Russian-EU conference, 
may or may not take into consideration Lithuania's position on the matter. While, 
unlike 1939, the territorial integrity of Lithuania appears to be sacrosanct, the 
country's sovereignty in the arena of foreign policy and international relations 
once again is being disregarded by two European powers.  
 
A solution to the Kaliningrad issue may be a long way off, but for the time being 
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